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Abstract
The “Intended nationally determined contributions” (INDCs) communicated by both
developing and developed countries represent a crucial element of the Paris agreement. This
paper aims at analysing the INDCs submitted by Parties, through the different tools and
approaches proposed by the research community. In particular, our analysis looks at the
different ways to assess the effectiveness of the proposed emission reduction pledges, both in
terms of aggregate and national efforts. However, we also consider other factors that will be
critical in determining the success of the Paris talks, such as the coherence and fairness of
single contributions.
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1. Introduction
On December 12th, 2015, global leaders gathered at the 21st session of UNFCCC Conference
of the Parties adopted a new, comprehensive climate agreement aimed at guiding the
international action from 2020 onward. Crucial elements of the agreement are the so-called
“Nationally determined contributions”, NDCs, which represent the tools through which both
developed and developing countries declare the actions they will undertake to tackle climate
changes. In setting the stage for the Paris deal, the Parties were required to communicate
“Intended nationally determined contributions” (INDCs) “well in advance” of the start of
negotiations. As of December 15, 2015, 160 Parties, representing 187 of the 196 UNFCCC
members, have submitted their INDCs to the Convention. National contributions need then to
be confirmed and subsequently updated but, by this point, they cover more than 98% of
global GHG emissions, enough to have a clear overview of national and aggregate efforts1.

2. The UNFCCC Synthesis Report
The UNFCCC published its synthesis report on October 30, 2015 (UNFCCC, 2015). The 66page document provides both qualitative and quantitative evaluations of the action plans
submitted by October 1st. It therefore focuses on a total of 147 Parties (including the European
Union’s 28 Member States), which represent 75% of UNFCCC Parties and cover 80% of the
global emissions in 2010. According to the report, all of them provide information about
mitigation actions, whereas 100 out of 119 contributions also contain adaptation measures.
INDCs, therefore, show a clearly increasing trend towards introducing national policies and
instruments for low-emission and climate-resilient development.
Comparing the proposed actions, the report states that emission growth resulting from the
proposed INDCs is expected to slow down by a third in the 2010–2030 period, in comparison
with the 1990–2010 period. In particular, the global emission level resulting from the INDCs
is expected to amount on average to 56.7 Gt CO2eq in 2030. This means an increase in the
range of 37–52% compared to 1990 levels.
Despite the broad and unprecedented involvement of countries in such a global effort, the
mitigation actions that have been submitted will not be sufficient to keep the world’s
temperature increase below the 2°C trajectory. In this regard, the report affirms that aggregate
projected annual emissions resulting from the INDCs “do not fall within least-cost 2 °C
scenarios by 2025 and 2030”. It also adds that the temperature at the end of the century will
depend heavily on many factors, including socioeconomic drivers, the development of
technology and the longer term actions of countries, and concludes that “making such
assumptions is beyond the scope of this report”.
Overall, INDC-related emissions remain higher than the emission levels consistent with the
least-cost 2°C scenarios by 15 (11 to 22) Gt CO2eq in 2030. Much greater mitigation efforts
will therefore be required after 2030.
The report further analyses the adaptation components included in the INDCs. Some
governments, especially among the least developing countries, have proposed it as their main
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priority for addressing climate change, in particular as they see strong linkages with national
development, sustainability and security. Proposed actions cover both strengthening and
scaling up existing efforts, as well as planning and implementation of new strategies,
programmes and plans in the future. In particular, most Parties have committed themselves to
formulating and implementing national adaptation plans (NAPs) by 2020. Often the most
vulnerable sectors are identified, such as water, agriculture, biodiversity and health, while the
most vulnerable communities turn out to be rural populations, in particular smallholders,
women, the young and the elderly.
3. Overview of the submitted INDCs
Beyond the analysis on the aggregate effect, INDCs offer many interesting insights that are
worth analysing.
First of all, the participation of countries is significantly higher than in previous attempts to
build a coordinated international action, namely the Kyoto Protocol and the Cancun pledges.
Current major emitting countries have submitted a mitigation pledge, which means that the
Paris agreement sees for the first time the top 5 emitters - EU, US, China, India and Russia cooperating together to reduce GHG emissions.
Table 1: Key emission figures and INDCs for top emitting countries
COUNTRY
GHG
emissions
[MtCO2eq]

DATA for 20122
GHG emissions GDP PPP
per capita
[constant
[MtCO2eq/pop]
2005
US$]

INDC
Base
year

Brazil

1.012,55

5,10

1,17

Emission
intensity
[MtCO2eq/
2005 trillion
US$]
865,43

Canada

714,12

20,55

1,30

549,32

-30

2005

2030

China

10.975,50

8,13

4,56

2.406,91

2005

2030

EU

4.399,15

8,70

14,94

294,45

from -60
to -65*
-40

1990

2030

India

3.013,77

2,44

1,39

2.168,18

2005

2030

Indonesia

760,81

3,08

0,43

1.769,33

from -33
to -35*
-29

BAU

2030

Japan

1.344,58

10,54

4,70

286,08

-26

2013

2030

Mexico

723,85

5,99

1,03

702,77

-22

BAU

2030

Russian
Federation
USA

2.322,22

16,22

0,98

2.369,61

1990

2030

6.235,10

19,86

14,14

440,95

from -25
to -30
from -26
to -28

2005

2025

Total major
emitters

31501,65
(70% of
global
emissions)
44.815,54

10,06 (average)

44,64
(81% of
global
GDP)
55,35

1185,30
(average)

Global

6,36 (average)

* GHG/GDP target
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809,68
(average)

Percent
reduction
pledge

Target
year

-43

2005

2030

Another aspect that stands out when evaluating INDCs is the wide heterogeneity among
submissions, both in terms of scope and coverage of mitigation efforts. Although the original
UNFCCC distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I countries has been overcome,
differences endure between the efforts of developed and developing countries. First of all,
while developed countries generally express their contributions in the form of a quantified
economy-wide mitigation effort compared to a reference year, developing countries usually
formulate their pledges in terms of emission intensity or link their emission reduction target to
a Business-as-Usual (BaU) scenario. Among the latter there are also countries that do not
specify a quantitative emission reduction commitment, while they focus on adaptation
measures or propose alternative approaches. This is the case of Bolivia, which proposes the
adoption of a “holistic development” as a new approach to reducing global emissions3. In line
with this vision, Bolivia issues a Climate Justice Index aimed at assessing the fair contribution
of each country to the global emission reduction target. The index is based on an assessment
of country’s ecological footprint, historical responsibility, development capacity,
technological capacity and population. According to the index, Annex I countries are entitled
to use 11% of the global CO2 budget, while non-Annex I countries have the right to exploit
the remaining 89% of the budget.
With reference to INDCs that present a quantitative decrease in emissions, different base
years have been proposed, since no binding rule has been established on this issue. Among
the largest emitters, some countries, including China and India, take 2005 as reference year,
EU and Russia relate their mitigation actions to 1990 levels of emissions, while Japan to
2013. This heterogeneity clearly shrinks data comparability and transparency of commitments.
Contributions also show differences in GHG coverage, as some of them cover only specific
sectors or gases. A controversial element is represented by the emissions from the Land Use,
Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector. In general, taking into account emissions
from LULUCF would soften mitigation efforts. The only significant exception is Brazil,
which shows a considerable increase in its emissions reduction effort when including the
LULUCF sector, since the vast extent of its forests, covering 59% of Brazilian territory,
operate as carbon sinks. As the Union of Concerned Scientists has pointed out, the top-ten
major emitters have scope for increasing their removal capacity from land sector: particularly,
United States and Canada, followed by China, India and Indonesia (Ferretti-Gallon and
Boucher, 2015a). However, among these countries, only China and India detail their
objectives concerning LULUCF, while Canada and United Stated do not declare any specific
mitigation effort for the land sector, or any detailed action on afforestation and reforestation
(Ferretti-Gallon and Boucher, 2015b).
4. Comparative analysis of mitigation efforts
Since mitigation actions included in the INDCs are expressed by using different metrics, it is
difficult to understand how ambitious the single efforts proposed by countries are. To
facilitate this task, Table 2 compares the emission reduction targets proposed by the top ten
emitting countries by putting them on an equal footing.
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When pledges are compared to 1990, figures show that the European Union stands out as the
first Party in terms of commitment, while both China and India crucially increase their GHG
in absolute terms by 2030 (see Figure 1). Of course, since China and India have proposed a
reduction in terms of CO2 intensity, the assessment is highly influenced by GDP estimates in
2030. In particular, the degree of change depends on assumptions about the growth rate for
GDP by 20304 (see column 7-8 of Table 2). Both countries have been experiencing an
extremely high growth in GDP and GHG emissions in recent years; however, China’s
emission intensity is higher than that of India, and is projected to be higher even in 2030 (Ray
et al. 2015).
Figure 1: Mitigation efforts with reference to 1990 emission levels, top emitters
(percentage value)
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Section (a) uses the data on GDP estimates for 2030 issued by the Socioeconomic Pathway 2 (SSP2), while section (b) employs data by the
Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP) of the International Energy Agency. The growth rate estimated by the first model is higher than the
second one and the difference affects results in comparing the reduction commitments of India and China, which are expressed in the form of
emission intensity (i.e. normalized on GDP).
Data
are
available
at
https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=about
(SSP)
and
http://www.iea.org/etp/etpmodel/assumptions/ (ETP).
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Table 2: Comparison of INDCs according to different metrics
INDC

COUNTRY

Equivalent pledges (excl. LULUCF)

GHG
reduction
(%)

Base
year

Target
year

GHG emissions
[MtCO2eq]

Emissions per GDPPPP [MtCO2eq/
2005 trillion US$]

Change wrt 1990

Change wrt 2005

Brazil

-43

2005

2030

840,19

941,92

-15

-43

Change in emission
per GDPwrt 2005
[MtCO2eq/2005
trillion US$]
-87

Canada

-30

2005

2030

722,57

620,76

-11

-30

-56

(a) SSP2 data: from
+1046 to +1210

(a) SSP2 data: from
+418 to +492

(b) ETP data: from +384
to +453

(b) ETP data: from
+119 to +150

-40

-37

(a) SSP2 data5: from
+1499 to +1548

(a) SSP2 data: from
+851 to +881

(b) ETP data: from +475
to +493

(b) ETP data: from
+242 to +253

China

EU

from -60 to 65*

-40

2005

1990

2030

2030

7.345,03

5.235,35

3238,55

511,76

from -60 to -65

-57

from -33 to 35*

2005

Indonesia

-29

BAU

2030

2881,00

946,15

422

226

-93

Japan

-26

2013

2030

1344,58

294,22

-16

-26

-29

Mexico

-22

BAU

2030

1110,00

416,01

99

32

-75

Russian
Federation

from -25 to 30

1990

2030

2.776,78

3293,93

from -25 to -30

from -3 to -9

from -86 to -87

USA

from -26 to 28

2005

2025

6.841,50

522,53

from -14 to -17

from -26 to -28

from -54 to -55

India

5

DATA for base year

2030

2.081,93

2496,32

See footnote 4.
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Mitigation efforts change when comparing data in terms of carbon intensity (i.e. normalized
on GDP). In this case, Indonesia, Brazil and Russia commit themselves to the highest level
(with a reduction of 93, 87, and 86% respectively), while India and Japan have the least
ambitious targets, with a decrease in emission intensity of around 30%. The European Union,
the United States and Canada present a similar reduction in emissions per GDP by 2005,
slightly above 50%. As a general trend, developing countries commit to the highest mitigation
efforts per unit of GDP. This can explain why China and India prefer to express their INDCs
in terms of reduction per GDP.

5. Assessing the ambition of INDCs mitigation contributions
Since the failure of Copenhagen climate conference in 2009, a number of studies have
focused on how mitigation efforts should be expressed in order to avoid misbalances and
enable comparability among countries.
Aldy and Pizer (2015) propose four principles to guide the set-up of efficient metrics to
compare mitigation efforts. First, an ideal metric would comprehensively represent the entire
mitigation effort of a country. Second, metrics should be observable, measurable and
quantitative. Third, metrics should be replicable by independent third parties. Finally, ideal
metrics would be universally applied among countries participating in global climate policy.
The study analyses a range of metrics to assess their effectiveness compared to the four
guiding principles: emissions metrics (emissions levels on a base year, emission intensities
and emission reductions from business as usual), price metrics (carbon and energy prices),
and cost metrics (such as mitigation costs). Results show that no single metric performs well
on all the criteria. Emissions abatement and abatement costs are deemed to be the best
indicators of mitigation efforts; however, they are the most difficult to measure. Aldy and
Pizer therefore suggest employing a portfolio of metrics for comparing emission reductions
among countries.
Before the adoption of Paris agreement, in the attempt to compare the ambition and efficiency
of the proposed efforts, many studies have provided an overview of the impact of INDCs on
global temperatures by assessing their adequacy and effectiveness in reaching an objective
that is generally consistent with the main aim of the Convention and the IPCC’s
recommendation to keep global warming below 2°C above pre-industrial temperatures.
Overall these assessments agree on the fact that the INDCs should be seen as a first step
toward the foundation of an ambitious global climate action but for now are not sufficient to
remain under the 2°C threshold.
Table 3 summarizes and compares five of these research efforts: the official UNFCCC
assessment report, the recently published UNEP Gap Report 2015 (UNEP, 2015), the Climate
Action Tracker (CAT, 2015), Climate Interactive’s “Climate scoreboard” (Climate
Interactive, 2015, the energy related estimates provided by the International Energy Agency
(IEA, 2015a).
In particular, the analyzed studies estimate an emissions gap between the full implementation
of unconditional INDCs’ mitigation actions and the least-cost emission path to the 2°C target
in 2030 in the range of 14 - 16 Gt CO2eq on average. These figures are in some cases then
7

translated into estimated temperature increase above pre-industrial levels in 2100.
Temperature values range from 3.5°C, as assessed by UNEP and Climate Interactive to a
more optimistic scenario projected by both CAT and the IEA leading to 2.6/2.7 °C. The
difference in temperature can, however, be explained by the assumptions that these models
take into account, especially concerning the post 2030 period. Specifically, the CAT assumes
that similar levels of effort will be undertaken after 2030, whereas Climate Interactive, and
presumably also UNEP, assume no further action after 2030.

Table 3: Comparison of estimates of global emission gap and global temperature
according to different tools

Global emission gap wrt
2°C target by 2030
(average)
Global temperature by 2100

UNFCCC

UNEP

CAT

CLIMATE
INTERACTIVE

IEA6

Average
value

15 Gt CO2
eq

14 Gt
CO2 eq

16 Gt
CO2 eq

14 Gt CO2 eq

N/A

14.75
Gt CO2
eq

N/A

3.5° C

2.7° C

3.5° C

2.6° C

3.1° C

UNEP’s assessment also points out that commitments do not present a veritable increase in
ambitions as compared to current policies. In fact, the emission level resulting from INDCs is
projected to be only 4 Gt CO2eq lower than the levels determined by current policies and
therefore “far from enough” (UNEP, 2015). Moreover, the CAT’s projections indicate that
current governments’ initiatives (the blue area in Figure 2) are not fully consistent with the
2030 pledges, meaning that further measures are necessary to achieve the mitigation targets
stated in the INDCs (CAT, 2015).
Figure 2: Effect of current pledges and policies on global temperature
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The IEA (2015a) also adds that following the INDCs submitted so far, and the planned energy
policies in other countries, the world is likely to consume the carbon budget consistent with a
2°C scenario by around 2040, thus eight months later than under current policies.
A different analysis can be derived by focusing on the peaking year of emissions led by the
implementation of INDCs, which, according to the UNFCCC assessment report, will happen
in 2030. Using data from the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU, 2015), which
adopts a counter-factual perspective to analyze the consequences of different peaking years,
keeping the temperature below 2° C at the end of the century would require an annual
reduction in emissions of 9.6% from 2030 onwards. This is, however, about three times more
than the maximum feasible annual abatement rate estimated by the model (3.5%). In addition,
ECIU suggests that if emissions peak in 2030, the only possible way to achieve the target of
2°C is by deploying negative emissions in the range of 4.1Gt CO2 per year, mainly through
the carbon capture and storage system or by increasing mitigation potential from the
LULUCF sector (ECIU, 2015).

6. A national perspective: between ambition, coherence and fairness
Beyond the rating of INDCs at a global level, some studies broaden their scope to the national
framework by evaluating the contribution of each party to the global mitigation effort. These
studies generally aim at a comprehensive assessment of national INDCs by not only
estimating their contribution to limit global temperature to the 2°C path, but also by analyzing
their coherence and fairness. According to Bosetti and Frankel (2014), for a workable and
acceptable system of emission targets, such as the one outlined in the Paris agreement, a
general notion of fairness needs to be recognized. They therefore identify three principles that
should guide a fair establishing of emission targets: i) national history of emissions, as it is
fair to expect countries that have increased their emissions rapidly to curb them; ii)
progressivity, considering that it is fair to expect rich countries to accept bigger cuts than poor
countries; iii) costs, which should not be disproportionately large.
In the context of future commitments to be regularly undertaken under the Paris Agreement,
assuring an equitable distribution of commitments, based on each country’s capacity and
responsibility, can indeed build a foundation for trust and cooperation between developed and
developing countries.
All the studies focusing on fair share agree that poorer and emerging countries have a right to
the majority of the global carbon budget, while developed nations have already used almost
the total amount of their fair portion. However, analyses differ on measuring single countries’
fair share in the available global carbon budget.
Using data from the LIMITS exercise, is it possible to understand the consistency of the
proposed action by the top 3 emitters and their single path toward the 2°C level 7. Under
current pledges, China’s commitment is indeed inconsistent with the 2°C target, though it is
with a 3°C target, and can therefore be seen as a continuation of the Copenhagen pledge. On
the contrary, the pathways to which the USA and the EU have committed themselves are
7
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consistent with most of the 2°C scenarios; in addition, the EU’s goal of achieving a long-term
mitigation reduction of 80-95% as compared to 1990 levels will even exceed the effort
required under the 2°C path.

Figure 3: Comparison of the INDC-related emissions paths of China, EU and US with
the 2°trajectory

In the effort to detail the coherence of countries regarding the proposed contribution, the
Netherland Environmental Assessment Agency PBL (2015) has developed a simple tool that
graphically compares, for each country, the emission trends following INDC with those
resulting from current policies and the BaU scenario. Data show that the United States and
China report the widest difference between the emission reduction proposed in their INDCs
and the estimated level of emissions under current policies. On the contrary, Brazil’s and
Indonesia’s current policies seem to be in line with their INDCs, although considerable
uncertainty remains on LULUCF emissions (Table 4, column 2).
CAT presents a more complex rating of INDCs, assessing countries as inadequate, sufficient,
medium or role model, according to three different criteria: the abatement effect of each
country’s current policies, the impact of INDC on emissions and the fair share of the
contribution in the global effort to stay below 2°C. According to CAT, only the INDC of
Bhutan is a “role model”, while most of the commitments are considered inadequate or rated
as medium (CAT, 2015). It is worth noting that, among those whose efforts are inadequate,
four are amid the top-ten largest emitters (Canada, Japan, Indonesia and the Russian
Federation), whereas China, the US and the EU are rated as “medium” (Table 4, column 3).
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Table 4: Comparison of different INDCs’ ratings
CRITERIA

COHERENCE

FAIR SHARE

IMPACT

Difference
between emission
levels in 2030
through INDCs
and current
national policies
[Gtons CO2 eq average values]

1. Consistency of
current policies on
emissions;
2. Impact of INDC
on emissions;
3. fairness of
commitment
towards 2°C

(a) INDCs'
contributio
n to fair
share

PBL

CAT

Oxfam

BRAZIL

0,03

Medium

2/3

0.82

-47

CANADA

-0,19

Inadequate

N/A

0.76

-55

CHINA

-1,05

medium with
inadequate carbon
intensity target

>1

0.63

-15

EU

-0,47

Medium

1/5

0.84

-378

INDIA

-0,37

Medium

1

0.9

-41

INDONESIA

-0,05

Inadequate

1

1.1

21

JAPAN

-0,10

Inadequate

1/10

0.83

-59

MEXICO

-0,21

Medium

N/A

1.04

-50

RUSSIAN
FEDERATI
ON

-0,28

Inadequate

0

0.6

-37

US

-1,72

Medium

1/5

0.8

-61

COUNTRY

(b) INDCs'
contribution
to fair share
(1= sufficient
ratio)

Novethic

(c)INDCs
mitigation
efforts gap
wrt fair
share
(percent)
ClimateFair
Shares

A report published by Oxfam International (2015) also provides a review of INDCs’ fairness,
by comparing commitments to an equitable share of the global mitigation effort needed to
maintain global warming below 2°C. Oxfam’s rating takes into account the historical
responsibility of countries and their capacity to tackle climate initiatives. According to the
index, the pledges of developed countries are far from representing a fair contribution. In
particular, Russia’s INDC represents zero contribution compared to a fair share, as projected
emissions are even higher than the BaU scenario; Japan’s effort averages a tenth of a fair
distribution, and the INDCs of the EU and the US are approximately a fifth of their estimated
fair portion. By contrast, the report highlights that contributions by developing countries
generally correspond to their fair share or even exceed it. The targets proposed by India and
Indonesia approximately equal their fair share, and China surpasses it by about 2 Gtons
CO2eq. Brazil represents an exception among emerging economies, covering about two thirds
of its equitable part of the global effort (Table 4, column 4).

8
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In advance for COP21, the French press agency Novethic (2015)9 developed a Climate effort
contribution index to assess INDCs on the basis of equity and efficiency in reaching the 2°C
target. The rating results from the comparison of each country’s mitigation effort with the 2°C
consistent emissions reduction the same country should undertake according to its capacity
and responsibility. The index rates the contributions of all the top ten greenhouse gases
emitters as insufficient, with the exception of Indonesia and Mexico, whose efforts exceed the
minimum required ratio. The commitments of Russia, China and Canada are the lowest in
terms of a fair contribution to the global mitigation effort, while the contributions of the other
largest emitters represent about 80% of their fair share (table 4, column 5).
Likewise, Climate Fairshares (2015), a joint initiative of the Stockholm Environment
Institute, Ecoquity and the institute for Governance and Sustainable Development (IGSD),
develops a fair share index that reflects countries’ responsibilities, capacities and sustainable
development. Indicators are based on the cumulative emissions of countries and their per
capita income, as compared to an estimate of the global distribution of wealth. According to
this analysis, among the top-ten emitters only Indonesia meets the effort required under a fair
share, and even exceeds it. None of the other largest emitters are contributing fairly to the
global mitigation effort. China, India and Mexico would have the right to scale-up their
emissions according to a fair share, but the increase in emissions they will determine by
implementing their INDCs is however excessive. The contributions of the US, Canada and
Japan show the greatest distance from a fair share, as their efforts are about 50% lower than
required (table 4, column 6).
According to a study by Laurent (2015) for the French Economic Observatory (OFCE), India,
Indonesia, China, Brazil and Mexico can still emit over 50 billion tons of CO2eq each as a
fair share of the global carbon budget at disposal up to 2040. Russia and Japan can only emit
less than 10 CO2eq tons billion each by 2040, and the US and Canada have already employed
more than their fair share, meaning that they have accumulated a CO2 debt with the rest of the
world. The study suggests comparing net emission levels to different parameters in order to
provide a better understanding of each country’s carbon share. For instance, if the amount of
emissions is normalized for GDP or the population, data show that the US presents the highest
level of emissions per capita while China has the highest value of emissions per GDP, even
considering the high economic growth ratio of the country. The paper also proposes to include
in the analysis the “imported emissions”, i.e. the emissions released in a country in order to
produce the manufactured items exported to another country.

7. Conclusions
The INDCs represent a breakthrough in terms of international efforts to curb future emissions
and can be considered as a first step in building the foundation for the successful
implementation of the Paris agreement. Positive consequences go beyond benefits on climate,
since the preparation of the INDCs has in many countries incentivized exploration of
connections between climate and development, as well as planning of new national climate
9
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polices. Although INDCs show a more ambitious endeavor towards de-carbonization as
compared to the Copenhagen pledges, current efforts are not sufficient to maintain global
warming below the recommended level of 2°C by the end of the century. Even if it is
optimistically assumed that the trend of emission reduction set out by INDCs is kept after
2030, global temperature is projected to reach 2.7°C by 2100. Reviewed studies highlight the
need for upscaling mitigation commitment by developed countries, in order to balance
contributions and lay the groundwork for establishing a global cooperation on a fair basis.
Besides, going beyond effectiveness and developing approaches that also take into account
other dimensions, such as coherence and fairness of the action, will help countries to
cooperate and play a proactive role in the global effort against climate change. To boost
chances of success of the Paris agreement, an adequate process of monitoring and revision is
fundamental to verify the progress countries make in reaching the goals and supporting
compliance.
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